16 set. Com base nas obras A teoria da democracia revisitada – o debate contemporâneo (Giovanni Sartori), Poliarquia: Participação e Oposição. A Teoria da Democracia Revisitada – Giovani Sartori. 5 likes. Book. From a contemporary point of view, within political science, reference may be made to the work of Giovanni Sartori, A Teoria da Democracia Revisitada, trans.
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As a starting point we assume that: Besides, any negotiation is always complex and repeatedly puts the trust in the executive at risk.
To answer that question one needs firstly to take into account that the Lula Administration is not, and has never been an exclusively PT-led government. The PSDB could not adopt the same strategy due to q risk of incurring costs from reactions of militants, consistent supporters and attentive publics.
As is generally known, this problem has been solved by the model of “coalition-based presidential system”: Rules for the use of petitions for separate voting DVS. According revvisitada him, cohesion “refers to the differentiation of political stances within a party before any discussion or voting on a given issue within the party itself”, while discipline regards “the party’s ability to control their members’ votes in parliament”.
President Lula, on the other hand, experienced a clearly distinct situation, since he relied on the support of governors elected by the two major opposition parties, PFL and PSDB, besides having the formal agreement of the latter in congressional votes. In these circumstances, the presidential agenda is passed and political stability is preserved, although shortcomings of representation and accountability may come up as another outcome of the game.
Social security reform in two stages
The particularities of decision-making surrounding the deliberation and passage of constitutional amendments plague the presidential agenda with high transaction costs, given the necessity of gathering supermajorities in the legislative arena Anastasia, Melo and Santos Finally, the federalist system opens the way for other actors within state arenas, or even in municipal ones, to express voters’ preferences in the national landscape. Journal of Theoretical Politics5 1: The Journal of Politics64 2: On the other hand, defections in the governing coalition were also large: These two steps bear clear continuity sartroi one another, but the mere need szrtori another constitutional change, right after President Lula’s rise to power, shows how limited was Cardoso’s success in his dealings with the givanni.
His report has not been voted yet. The Cardoso government paid a high price on not having control sratori the committee designed to evaluate PEC The president is left with the option of mobilizing resources available in other arenas, such as patronage and budgetary expenditures, through which he may signal to members of Congress with some “selective incentives” to cooperation. The dynamics at play is largely as follows: One should also acknowledge that, in contrast with the PT, the PSDB had had in the social security reform one of the cornerstones of its ideology.
Further, we could verify heoria variations in the game outcomes and actors’ behavior from one moment to the other. However, the scenario would be entirely different had Lula been sarfori winner in That move forced deputies to choose between their leadership in Congress and their respective governors, in the latter case perhaps with an eye to possible rewards in the state arena.
O que foi escrito sobre democracia
In every single roll-call, the administration could count on some votes from PFL and PSDB, which were decisive in the passage of EA 4, in the rejection democraciia DVS 7 and for the final passage of the reform in the second round. Throughout the voting ervisitada both reforms, PSDB, PFL and PT had to deal concomitantly with actors inside the executive, attentive publics, consistent supporters and electors.
Only in the voting of EA 1 this distinction had no influence whatsoever in the behavior of PFL members: Based on attitudinal data from deputies, Carvalho strives to show that both the partisan and distributive approaches should be employed to understand deputies’ behavior in Congress.
Our argument stresses that the switch of places between government and opposition, a contextual change caused by the elections, greatly affected preferences, available resources and strategies, and the behavior of each of the main actors concerned. Even though the party has to be heard and considered, as the president’s party and the largest governing caucus inthe PT knew that it was not to rule alone and would be always in need of votes from other congressional forces backing Lula.
Studies in American Political Development2: One of the central features of the PEC initiated by Cardoso was its multidimensionality.
The behavior of its deputies on the floor did not depend on the operation of institutional mechanisms exogenous to the party. According to Zylberstajn”no attempt at social security reform achieved so much, in so short time”. Theory and evidence from the Brazilian case”. Inversely to what happened during the Cardoso administration, Lula faced few votes until the final passage of his proposal and was not defeated in any of them.
These changes led to the concentration of demofracia powers in the hands of party leaders and the president, restricting significantly the discretion of other actors. This article analyzes Brazilian social security reform during the Fernando Henrique and Lula Administrations. In the second part, we turn our attention specifically to a comparison of patterns of behavior on the floor.
Coordination with state governors. Our second point is based on a key assertion by Tsebelis to the effect that rewards reaped in the sarori arena of a multiple arena game are influenced by the prevailing situation in other arenas.
Revista de Ciencias Socialesvol.
This is a sharp contrast with the leftist parties’ behavior in both periods. If one adds to the total the PP caucus, which declared themselves independent, but whose leadership in reality recommended voting with the government, Lula’s base of support came to number deputies.
A Teoria Da Democracia Revisitada – Giovanni Sartori – Google Books
Democrzcia, strategies and resources are different for each legislator, depending on his ideological persuasion, party affiliation and membership either in the governing coalition or in the opposition.
Rio de Janeiro, Saraiva, vol.
Soon after its initial proposal had been dismembered into four constitutional amendments, the Cardoso administration implied that a negotiation with the opposition would be welcomed, but had this route blocked by the PT Melo, The administration made three key concessions in order to pass the amendment in the Chamber of Deputies: To begin with, the electorate votes for two legislative houses using distinct electoral rules.
In our view, the changes observed in legislative behavior can be explained by the impact of the elections on the way actors were located within the solidarity and organized interests systems in the different decision-making arenas. In other words, politically sensitive occasions like the reforms signal that betray your party or the administration may be actually less onerous than betraying your own electoral base.
Arnold argues that the legislator when deciding on policy should: Then what is the key variable to specify the weightiest side of the Brazilian decision-making process?
Such factors, as the above-mentioned authors emphasize, allow the Brazilian institutional arrangement to become consistent with the stability of democratic order: This “clearing” benefited the PT-led government, which could concentrate its efforts in two issues: The former petition aimed at the suppression of the retiree’s contribution, while the latter targeted the reform’s cut in the pensions left by deceased public servants.